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Epilepsy, digital technology and the black-boxed self 
 
In 2008 British artist Gus Cummins created a piece of video art entitled ‘Invaders’. 
Mimicking the interface of the classic 1970s arcade video game Cummins used his alien 
theme to figuratively relay the experience of having epilepsy. Like the attacking space 
invaders, epilepsy assaults the subject’s autonomy, threatening the individual’s control 
over their own mind and body, and agency: ‘rogue neurons invade my brain / seizures 
invade comfort zones / expectations invade lives’ (Cummins, 2008). Here the recall of 
this old new media, with its blinking, pixelated graphics and repetitive synthesised music 
soundtrack, its rapid and high-stress game play reliant on hand-eye coordination, and its 
battle scenario, complete with laser-shooting alien enemies and multiple lives, may evoke 
nostalgic memories for some viewers. Simultaneously it represents an environment 
whose features press at the thresholds of the seizure-prone brain. Cummins further 
overlays this interface with aural and visual renderings of his own seizure patterns, which 
bombard the viewer’s senses. The chaotic experience of the individual who is seizing is 
conflated with a visual spectacle reminiscent of the drama of witnessing a seizure. 
Cummins’ artwork asks viewers to construct meaning from such informational excess, 
while undermining the valence of sensory data.  
 ‘Space Invaders’ gains its effects in part by tapping into a cultural tradition in 
which epilepsy has been conceived in terms of electrical media, and visual technologies in 
particular. This analogy seems almost a given today (although in fact is only one model 
among many by which epilepsy has been thought about through its long history). The 
development of electroencephalography (EEG) technology after 1929 demonstrated that 
this highly-stigmatised chronic brain condition, often accompanied by spectacular 
symptomatology, was the result of excessive electrical discharge across the neural 
networks in the brain; since then, with the advent of modern computing, epilepsy has 
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been heavily associated with malfunctioning digital machines. In this article I trace this 
history of epilepsy’s affinities with new media, following scholars such as Friedrich 
Kittler (2010), Matthew Rubery (2016) and others, who argue that the emergence of new 
technologies has long been intertwined with new conceptions of dis/ability.1  
To trace this history, I draw on instances of epilepsy’s (technological) 
representation in the socio-cultural imaginary across the last 100 years. In addition, I 
place this wider narrative in conversation with interviews conducted with people with 
epilepsy (PWE) about their use of social and new media.2 These interviews are conceived 
methodologically as examples of co-produced accounts of identity representation, to be 
interpreted across a wider set of cultural texts, rather than as offering any kind of 
‘revealed’ truth (Savage and Burrows, 2007; Atkinson and Silverman, 1997; Roach, 2014). 
In bringing them together I follow disabilities scholar Rosemarie Garland Thomson 
(1997), who famously argued that ‘representation attaches meaning to bodies’ and that 
disability is a ‘representation, a cultural interpretation of physical transformation or 
configuration, and a comparison of bodies that structures social relations and 
institutions, ... the attribution of corporeal deviance’ (pp. 5, 6). Coining the helpful term 
of ‘normate’ to describe the ‘social figure through which people can represent themselves 
as definitive human beings’, Garland Thomson indicates that the normate and the 
                                                        
1 While schizophrenia has received the bulk of attention from media scholars, thanks in 
part to Victor Tausk’s classic 1919 article ‘On the Origin of the ‘Influencing Machine’ in 
Schizophrenia’ (English trans, 1933), epilepsy’s neurological origin and ambiguous 
position between physical disability and stigmatized mental illness makes it a compelling 
study for media theorists. 
2 I draw on 15 semi-structured interviews conducted with members of the Epilepsy 
Action e-mail list between May 2014 and December 2015. Participants were asked about 
their usage of social media and networked-digital devices generally and for epilepsy-
management. Within this context, they were asked to reflect on their identity and self-
representation online. The research was conducted in collaboration with Leone Ridsdale 
at the Institute of Psychiatry, Psychology & Neuroscience, King’s College London 
[Research Ethics Committee no. PNM/13/14-18]. My thanks to the participants, to 
Epilepsy Action for facilitating contact, and to Leone Ridsdale for her support and 
guidance. 
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disabled are mutually-constituted figures (1997: 8). While epilepsy has an uneasy 
relationship to physical disability (Wendell, 2013) and is often mistakenly conceived as a 
mental illness, the epileptic body is frequently encoded as deviant and non-normate, 
becoming, like Garland Thomson’s extraordinary bodies ‘a repository for social anxieties 
about such troubling concerns as vulnerability, control, and identity’ (1997: 6). As David 
T. Mitchell and Sharon L. Snyder have argued, historically disability has functioned as a 
‘narrative prosthesis’, a ‘crutch upon which literary narratives lean for their 
representational power, disruptive potential and analytical insight’, (2000: 49), or what 
Ato Quayson describes as an excessive sign that invites, yet resists interpretation (2007; 
14). In this article I demonstrate the ways in which epilepsy has been heavily 
technologized in the second half of the twentieth century and outline the implications of 
this for representations of the PWE today. Tracking this connection across the 
emergence of the ‘societies of control’ (Deleuze, 1992) reveals suggestive parallels 
between the stigmatised PWE and the data-driven subject (the ‘dividual’) of today’s 
digital environment. As Amit Pinchevski and John Durham Peters note, ‘Pathology not 
only reveals normality, as the doctors have always said, but it also reveals technology’ 
(2016: 2508). 
 
Conceptualising Epilepsy 
One of the most common serious brain condition worldwide, epilepsy affects at least 50 
million people worldwide, with around 80 per cent of PWE living in low-income 
countries with little access to medical treatment (WHO, 2016). In the UK 1% of the 
population are affected by epilepsy (Ridsdale, et al, 2011). Epilepsy can be overt, i.e. 
symptomatic (caused by to damage to the brain), cryptogenic (inferred damage to the 
brain) or idiopathic (no known cause). Epilepsy is characterised by the occurrence of 
seizures, which are caused by disruptions to the brain’s electrical impulses, and excessive 
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discharge of energy across a group of cells. Not all seizures are due to epilepsy and the 
diagnosis covers a spectrum of epilepsies. Seizures can vary in type, severity and 
frequency and are usually distinguished as being either focal (partial) or generalised. In 
the former the seizure affects only part of the brain to begin with, with symptoms 
dependent on the area of the brain involved. These can range from temporary loss of 
movement or repetitive movements, the experience of strong emotions or tastes, to loss 
of speech and other cognitive abilities. In generalised seizures both hemispheres of the 
brain are affected, usually with a loss of consciousness involved (sometimes extremely 
brief). So-called ‘tonic-clonic’ seizures are historically associated with epileptic seizures 
that involve loss of consciousness and muscle jerks, although others involve only brief 
states of altered consciousness, often with the appearance of daydreaming (absence), 
muscle jerks (myoclonic) and other symptoms. In convulsive tonic-clonic seizures the 
brain can be deprived of oxygen, leading to its further injury. The medical emergency 
status epilepticus is the continuation of a seizure or cluster of seizures for more than thirty 
minutes and can lead to brain injury and death. Epilepsy also brings with it the risk of 
sudden unexpected death in epilepsy (SUDEP), the cause of which is unknown. More 
commonly, PWE suffer injuries (or even death) as a result of seizures, including 
drowning, burns, tongue-biting, head injuries, bruises and muscle strain. Photosensitivity 
and stress can act as triggers. There is currently no cure and treatment relies heavily on 
the use of anti-convulsive drugs, many of which have extensive side effects. For around a 
third of PWE, available treatments do not work.  
Epilepsy has been heavily stigmatised across cultures and time periods, resulting 
in what today is understood as felt and enacted stigma (Scambler, 1989, 2009). 
Throughout history epilepsy has often signified ‘some sort of catastrophic upheaval in 
codes of propriety and the symbolic order’ (Stirling, 2008: 2). Like many neurological 
conditions, epilepsy was poorly understood prior to the twentieth century and frequently 
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associated with spirit possession, religious ecstasy, mental illness and moral turpitude. 
While identification of epilepsy as a brain disorder has helped to assuage some stigma, 
even today, myths and misinformation around epilepsy are, as Sallie Baxendale and 
Annette O’Toole (2007) have noted, ‘alive and foaming’.  
In the nineteenth century confusion around the multiplicity of seizure-types 
slowed identification, while also opening up epilepsy to a wide range of discourses and 
representational economies. In this period spasms were associated with hysteria, 
eclampsia and orgasm, helping to position epilepsy within a discourse of feminine excess. 
Similarly, confusion around its relationship with catalepsy ensured that epilepsy was 
situated on the borderlands of scientific knowledge and entertainment (Willis, 2014). 
Assessing the ‘aesthetics of the spasm’ in nineteenth century novels, Peter Cryle (2008) 
argues that ‘In the [epilepsy] spasm, pain, pleasure, the expression of inner forces, and an 
intimate foreknowledge of death were held together in one utterly compelling symptom’. 
Throughout its history the seizure has been conceived to be involuntary on the part of 
the individual experiencing it, but stimulating as a metaphorical trope within the wider 
culture.   
Despite the spasms being on the spectrum of normal bodily function, as Jeanette 
Stirling (2008) has pointed out, the epileptic seizure is often conceived in modernity as a 
symptom of an uncontrolled body in need of Foucauldian discipline (p. 31). Interviewees 
recount that they are considered drunk by passersby if they seize on the street, with 
significant ramifications for the amount of support they receive (Participants 4, 10). The 
agency and (criminal) responsibility of the subject has often been an open question, 
something that crime writers from Robert Louis Stevenson to Agatha Christie have 
deployed to their advantage. Meanwhile the unconscious or mechanical actions that 
seemed to characterise some seizure states appeared to suggest to doctors and writers 
alike that the seizing subject resembled an automaton. Possessing both too much agency 
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and not enough, the PWE was positioned as troubling to post-Enlightenment 
conceptions of the subject. 
The tonic-clonic seizure has particularly marked the individual with epilepsy: 
representative of the uncontrollable body in an increasingly rationalising society. The 
advent of what James Beniger (1986) called the ‘Control Revolution’ of the late 
nineteenth century and the concomitant emphasis on classification, standardization and 
efficiency would begin to position the seizing body as resistant. Much has been written 
on the implications of this revolution, and on associated classificatory systems such as 
those of Alphonse Bertillon and Francis Galton, for conceptions of the citizen-subject in 
this era (Sekula, 1986; Seltzer, 1992). Such a capitalist framework, with its requirement 
for the factory worker’s body to be managed, standardised, and efficient, rendered the 
individual with epilepsy as threatening this order. Whether considered contagious, 
‘defective’, malingering, or with increasing sympathy, the high number of PWE 
categorised as paupers in this period would not only render them doubly-stigmatised, (a 
trend that continues today (Stone 1985)), but tied representations of the ‘epileptic’ to 
contemporary anxieties around racial degeneration. The development of colonies in this 
era was partly a response to the question of how to render the lives of ‘idiots’ and 
‘epileptics’ useful and protected, just as their rural setting seemed to offer a means of 
rendering the patient invisible to the wider social body while simultaneously opening 
their bodies up to the gaze of the medical establishment.3   
Analogy with visual technologies and surveillance would aid understanding of 
epilepsy in the so-called ‘golden age of neurophysiology’ (Brazier, 1957; 212). The ‘father 
of epilepsy’, neurologist John Hughlings Jackson (1835-1911) was to describe focal 
seizures as examples of ‘double consciousness’ and a ‘dreamy state’, underlining the 
                                                        
3 Although, such establishments did inadvertently encourage solidarity amongst inmates 
and the eventual emergence of institutions such as the International League Against 
Epilepsy.  
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transformative effect epilepsy could have on the subject’s viewpoint (Friedlander, 2001; 
212-13). Continuing in this vein and thanks to its earlier associations with possession and 
prophesy, cultural links between epilepsy and creativity have been retained across the 
twentieth century. Cesare Lombroso (1835–1909) first wrote of the ‘epileptoid nature of 
genius’ when noting the number of famous men with the condition, although it was his 
association between epilepsy and the criminal personality that has unfortunately gained 
the most cultural traction (qtd. in Temkin, 1971: 368). Today epilepsy charities often 
emphasize creative associations in attempts to assuage negative stereotypes and to 
promote the experiences of those writers and artists living with epilepsy and their 
representations of the condition.  
However, it is the viewpoint of the observer that has dominated cultural 
representations of epilepsy. Lisa Cartwright (1995) has persuasively argued that today’s 
visual surveillance of the body has an etiology in the ‘neurological gaze’ of the late 
nineteenth century (see also Norden, 1994). While the epistemological primacy of visual 
knowledge in neurology had been upset by the realization of the systemic structure of the 
body (rather than as observable static organs) on the one hand and psychoanalysis’s 
denial of surface reading on the other, the fin-de-siècle was also a period in which 
neurologists turned to new visual technologies to study patients. Pointing to the use of 
photographic series and motion studies of patients by neurologist Jean-Martin Charcot 
and others, Cartwright argues that such films and images pose questions around 
‘scientific spectatorship, visual pleasure, and cinematic surveillance.’ (p. 48) She discusses 
the so-called ‘Epilepsy Biographs’, filmed at the Craig Colony for Epileptics (NY) in 
1905 by neurologist Walter Greenough Chase at the request of medical superintendent 
William Spratling. These films, a ‘metaphor for Spratling’s own anxiety about neurology’s 
inability to control epilepsy’, surveil the inmates’ seizures in minute detail, while failing to 
establish the condition’s source (p. 63). In so doing, they outlined the ‘broader paradox 
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of modern neurology: the need to calculate vectors of pathology that are not best 
characterized by visibility or fixed locale, through the discipline’s traditional techniques 
of observation, recording, and classification’ (p. 64). While medicine today utilizes a 
number of technologies to ‘objectively’ envision the internal systems of the body in a bid 
to manage and cure illness, as Joseph Dumit (2004) and Catherine Waldy (2000) have 
argued such imaging and its interpretation is strongly encoded by our own technological, 
medical and cultural assumptions. 
 
Electrical Epilepsy 
Today, one of the most common tropes regarding epilepsy is that of epilepsy as an 
electrical event. The theory of the electrical basis of epilepsy first gained attention with 
Hughling Jackson’s 1873 definition that ‘Epilepsy is the name for occasional, sudden, 
excessive, rapid, and local discharges of grey matter.’ (Jackson, 1873) The theory had in 
fact been proposed and tested over twenty years earlier by the clinical neurologist Robert 
Bentley Todd in 1849, as E. H. Reynolds (2001) has demonstrated, who concluded that 
‘The periodic evolutions of the nervous force which give rise to the complete epileptic 
paroxysm may be compared to the electrical phenomenon described by Faraday under 
the name of disruptive discharge.’ (Todd, 2005; 1004) However, Todd’s experiments 
were overlooked and subsequent research was hampered by confusion surrounding 
vascular theories, the plurality of epilepsies and neuronal function and discharge 
(Reynolds and Trimble, 2009). It was only in 1929 that Hans Berger would prove 
Jackson’s theory via EEG (Friedlander, 2001; 99). In the decade following, experiments 
with EEG helped pioneers such as William Lennox, Frederic and Erna Gibbs, Hallowell 
Davis and Herbert Jasper in America and W. Grey Walters and Frederick Golla at the 
Maudsley Hospital in London to establish that seizures were the result of abnormal 
electrical impulses in the brain’s neural network and that EEG in turn could be used as a 
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diagnostic test for the condition (Bladin, 2006). 
As a result of these medical advances, it is now extremely common for epilepsy 
to be depicted in terms of electrical systems: ‘I am an electrical impulse. I discharge at random 
across a synapse, at the threshold of a seizure.’ (Hawthorne, 1992; 1) Ray Robinson’s 2006 novel 
Electricity plays extensively with the parallel, as protagonist Lily O’Connor works first in 
an arcade complete with synthesized sounds and flashing lights, before dating electrical 
contractor Dave. As we later discover, Dave has been photographing Lily’s naked, 
seizing body and likely selling on the images to others. The ‘flash. White light’ of the 
camera is indistinguishable from her ictal state and the analogy between tech and seizure 
that renders Lily vulnerable to such abuse (p. 320). Her attempt to ‘make him invisible’ 
following this discovery highlights the overburdened association between knowledge and 
vision, between knowledge and electrical light in our culture and the vexed implications 
of this for people living on its threshold (p. 321).  
The development of EEG technologies offered clinicians and neurologists a 
means of envisioning brain activity and anatomy. The electrical pattern of a seizure (its 
course if not its cause) has become visible to medicine as an electrical system functioning 
imperfectly. During diagnosis PWE are often stimulated with flashing lights to provoke 
an EEG response. Over the last half century, new technologies such as videotelemetry, 
Positron emission tomography, Magnetic Resonance Imaging and Single-photon 
Emission Computer Tomography have further underscored parallels between vision, 
technology and abnormal brain activity. Such visibility has improved diagnosis – and 
rendered certain surgical procedures possible – even though a cure for epilepsy remains 
elusive. If anything, medical emphasis on seeing the seizure has, as Stirling argues, 
privileged the ‘technologies of epilepsy’ over PWEs’ in the twentieth century experiences 
of symptomatology (2008; 182). In this respect, computational medicine has done little to 
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advance the situation facing nineteenth-century PWEs, who were regularly subjected to 
the spectacular gaze of clinicians and neurologists.  
 
Cybernetic Epilepsy 
Over the last eighty years, the parallel between epilepsy and technology has been 
underscored thanks to the development and widespread use of electronic digital 
computing. Since midcentury computers have dominated all aspects of society, including 
medicine; we no longer live in the world of Krapp’s analogue tapes, but an environment 
dominated by the ‘either-or logic’ of binary computing, what Manuel Castells (2009-
2010) titled the ‘Information Age’. For the PWE, for the cultural representation of the 
condition, this wider realignment has had a number of local results.  
Many of the early advances in digital computing were underpinned by the new 
field of cybernetics. Drawing on the pioneering work of Alan Turing and John von 
Neumann, and spearheaded by mathematicians Claude Shannon, Norbert Wiener and 
colleagues such as neurophysiologist Warren S. McCulloch, this new science of 
information concerned the ‘control and communication in the animal and the machine’ 
(Wiener, 1961). Emphasising the study of systems, whether organic or mechanical, 
cybernetics offered biologists, neurologists and psychiatrists new approaches to thinking 
about the design and function of anatomical and neurological systems, just as much as it 
stimulated those working in electrical engineering, artificial intelligence and computer 
design. Encouraging parallels between human and technological systems, cybernetics 
would do much to promote the point that ‘the brain and the computing machine have 
much in common’ in the years after the Second World War (Wiener, 1961; 144; Von 
Neumann, 1963). As part of a broader popularization of this now pervasive metaphor, 
epilepsy would increasingly be conceived in terms of this computational systems: the 
seizing body as a sign of the catastrophic failure of operability within an overloaded 
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electrical network. Like Arnie’s damaged Terminator, visibly sparking and 
malfunctioning, the seizing body was now the spectacular indicator of a machine on the 
verge of failure.  
The huge importance of cybernetics encourages us to conceive of the conceptual 
movement between cybernetics and epilepsy as unidirectional and originating with the 
former. However, if we attend more closely to the intellectual history of cybernetics, a 
very different picture emerges – one in which thinking about epilepsy informs 
cybernetics and not the other way around. We can, in other words, feasibly talk of an 
epileptiform cybernetics. For Norbert Weiner, epilepsy was a key indicator of the brain’s 
computational structure in his field-defining Cybernetics (1948) and many of the 
cybernetician pioneers had in fact trained as neurologists and physiologists in the 1930s 
and 1940s. Most tangibly, it was the twelve years that McCulloch spent studying seizure 
patterns and trauma-related epilepsy as part of a general interest in brain localisation that 
led him to the theories advanced in one of cybernetics seminal papers, co-written with 
Walter Pitts (1943), on the function of neural networks (Abraham, 2016). Drawing on 
McCulloch’s knowledge of brain physiology gleaned through his years working on 
epilepsy, the paper made an analogy between the “all-or-none” law from physiology 
(effectively that a nerve has a finite threshold that excitation must exceed for it to fire) 
and Boolean logic (Abraham, 2002). At the same time that he was advancing the field of 
cybernetics, McCulloch continued to follow clinical advances in epileptology both as part 
of his role as Head of the Neurophysiology Laboratory at the University of Illinois, 
luring Frederic and Erna Gibbs there from Harvard to continue their work on epilepsy 
and EEG (Hughes, Penney and Stone, 1994), and later when he moved to MIT. 
Meanwhile over in Britain a number of early members of the Ratio Club, including Jack 
Cowan and W. Grey Walter, would combine their interest in the new field of cybernetics 
with research into epileptiform brain wave patterns and seizure thresholds (Husbands 
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and Holland, 2012; Pickering, 2010). Placing the ‘neurological gaze’ at the heart of 
technological advances at mid century, in a very real sense cybernetics originated and 
developed within a broader context of epilepsy research and not the other way around. 
Either way, across the last fifty years parallels between overloaded (or 
threateningly out of control) computers and the epilepsy brain have pervaded cultural 
representations of the disease. Artist and author Richard F. Davis presents the 
experience of epilepsy as something out of a science-fiction future. In the acrylic painting 
‘Virtual Memory Gone’ (n.d) a brain is being attacked – fried – by crackling charges of 
electricity emitted from computer chips. Writing in his memoir Seized Again, Davis 
emphasizes the failure of the analogy between brain and computer: ‘Our brain wires 
cannot be replaced... If you lose your wires, you can’t throw out your internal computer 
out and get a new one... Complete memory gone’ (2011; 169, bold in original). 
Computational metaphors also feature centrally in explanatory settings; PWEs commonly 
describe their condition via analogy with the failure of digital technology: ‘I switch off. 
Reboot my computer and then all of a sudden ...  where I stopped I’ll start talking again... 
it’s almost like somebody switched a flick on me.’ (Participant 6)4 Figuring the seizure as 
one of (social) system failure helps to position the condition as one of bodily rather than 
mental limitation and in doing so potentially reduce associated stigma. Concretising the 
problem in this way offers a means by which a line can be drawn between an essential 
and transcendental selfhood and the physical limitations of faulty wiring or corrupted 
discs.  
In an era dominated by digital networked technologies, these parallels have 
become, if anything more pervasive. Conceiving of epilepsy in terms of cybernetics can 
                                                        
4 I leave the spoonerism in for its lovely echo of N. Katherine Hayles’s (1993) concept of 
both the ‘flickering signifier’, and its concomitant reminder that we deal here in the 
bringing together of ‘language with a psychodynamics based on the symbolic moment 
when the human confronts the posthuman’ (n.pag). 
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also draw attention to other examples of what Eugene Thacker (2003) calls ‘biomedia’, or 
‘an instance in which biological components and processes are informatically 
recontextualized for purposes that may be either biological or nonbiological’ and the uses 
to which they have been put culturally (p. 52). Deployed neutrally – ‘epilepsy is not 
unlike a computer virus—bad code that hijacks the system’s circuitry to run its malicious 
program’ (Gay, 2015: 82) – biomedia can help to neutralize older stigmatic associations, 
between epilepsy and moral failings, for example. However, they can also be deployed to 
affirm cultural discrimination in our digitally oriented world. The analogy between brain 
and computer can be used to erode these individuals’ statuses – already precarious – as 
subjects. Historically, subjectivity has been entangled with claims about higher level 
consciousness, with these ‘modes of awareness’ (Hayles, 2017) equated to greater agency 
and in turn  used to police borders between human and machine. The altered 
consciousness that is characteristic of many epilepsy seizures can unfortunately be 
deployed to underline parallels between the PWE and the automaton, denying 
subjectivity. It is therefore alarming to see ‘seizure’ deployed on Twitter, for example, in 
a derogatory sense a full 41% of the time, as McNeil et al’s (2010) study demonstrated. 
Elsewhere examination of popular epilepsy-related videos on YouTube resulted in 
similar findings, with ‘persistent stigma and misinformation towards epilepsy’ 
demonstrated in comments (Lo, Esser and Gordon, 2010; 545). More worryingly, 
responses to hacker group 4Chan’s 2008 attack on epilepsy online forums (by posting 
flashing gifs in the hope of producing seizures in those with photosensitive epilepsy, a 
depressingly common occurrence) spoke of such efforts as ‘hacking peoples [sic] 
unpatched brains’ (Weev qtd. in Schwartz, 2008). Characterising the epileptic brain as 
faulty software in need of an urgent update in this context evokes the eugenics-driven 
programmes to sterilize PWE that existed in many American states and countries as late 
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as the 1970s. Presenting epilepsy within the context of biomedia can have real-world 
implications for people’s sociopolitical statuses.  
 
Black Box/Black Bag 
While brain-computer analogies proliferate in our culture, it is a more precise metaphor 
that fuels one of the most practically significant analogies made between epilepsy and 
new media: the cybernetic black box. Black-boxing was an approach developed during 
the Second World War in which rather than opening up an entity to discover its 
operations (which in the case of a missile might risk detonating it), focus was placed 
entirely on inputs and outputs. By examining how the observed system interacted with its 
environment, the researcher could perhaps deduce what went on inside the black box, or 
more radically, ignore the innards of the container entirely. A ‘new epistemic object’, the 
black box offered what Philipp von Hilgers described as ‘the chance to continuously and 
operatively determine anew the relation between knowing and not-knowing’ (2011; 46, 
52). This approach was central to first-order cyberneticists. 
Neurophysiologists were also amenable to this ‘new epistemic object’. Before the 
advent of medical imagining enabled scientists and doctors to ‘see’ inside the brain, the 
black-boxed approach was de facto the only means of acquiring knowledge of its inner 
workings. Invasive localization techniques had not proved as useful as hoped, nor had 
early attempts at brain surgery; by contrast, EEG offered a new way of recording brain 
function and a new output that could be measured and quantified. For early 
cyberneticists like McCulloch, who had trained as a neurophysiologist and was interested 
in neural networks, the black box was an appealing concept. As psychiatrist and 
cyberneticist W. Ross Ashby made explicit: ‘Though the problem [of the black box] arose 
in purely electrical form, its range of application is far wider. The clinician studying a 
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patient with brain damage and aphasia may be trying, by means of tests given and speech 
observed, to deduce some of the mechanisms that are involved.’ (1956; 86)  
Such black boxing privileges the perspective of the observer; in the case of 
epilepsy the perspective of the diagnosing clinician is privileged and over the last thirty 
years, the PWE has been heavily black-boxed by medicine. Even as brain imaging has 
improved, in the absence of a cure the medical focus in epilepsy has been on tracking 
inputs and outputs, monitoring seizures and managing symptoms and pharmacological 
side effects. The ideal is to obtain perfect ‘control’, defined clinically by a lack of seizures 
and culturally by the invisibility of their epilepsy identity to observers – one interviewee 
offered the suggestive anecdote that she wore an epilepsy bracelet as a kind of cipher: a 
sign that, while visible and therefore protecting her from accusations of hiding her 
condition, could only be decoded with the right knowledge key (Participant 1). For PWE 
today the result of this black-boxing is often the demand that they record all symptoms 
via a seizure diary. Such self-observation is not only burdensome in terms of time and 
attention but for many well-nigh impossible given that the individual is often not aware if 
they have had a partial seizure. What is termed ‘self-management’ is often enacted as a 
form of surveillance by a family member.  
This movement toward seizure monitoring is part of a more general trend in 
medicine. The medical sociologist David Armstrong has proclaimed that we live in an era 
of ‘Surveillance Medicine’. In describing an emergent (Foucauldian) mode of medicine 
based on the surveillance of normal populations, Armstrong identified several features 
that characterize this mode: the dissolution of categories of ill and healthy via the 
problematization of ‘normal’; a new predictive orientation in the relationship established 
between sign, symptom and illness; and the relocation of illness outside the space of the 
corporeal body. Armstrong persuasively argued that Surveillance Medicine inaugurated a 
new conception of illness, wherein ‘health no longer exists in a strict binary relationship 
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to illness’, but as a network of risk factors and a ‘point of perpetual becoming’. In turn, 
these practices delineate a new ‘temporalised risk identity’, with ‘patients’ given 
responsibility to monitor their own data points (1995; 400, 402, 403). For the increasing 
number of individuals living with incurable chronic diseases, such as epilepsy, migraine, 
arthritis or diabetes, under this regime such an identity is not only perpetually present, 
but also rendered in terms of personal responsibility: risk can be managed only through 
better data analysis and control. As sociologists of illness have noted, any deterioration in 
condition or relapse is often conceived by others as a personal failing (Wendell, 2013; 
170); not only do subjects experience profound suffering, what Michael Bury (1982) 
described as ‘biographical disruption’ and Kathy Charmaz (1983) ‘loss of self’, but they 
are also held accountable for such social discrediting (Goffman, 1963).  
Although Armstrong’s essay was retrospective in its focus, identifying a mode 
with its origins earlier in the twentieth century, the patterns he discussed have been only 
magnified by digital health technologies and practices in the years since his article was 
published. Since the mid 1990s, the development of the Internet, Web 2.0 and digital 
health technologies, have supposedly opened the ‘black bag’ of medicine and healthcare 
that epilepsy treatment exemplifies (Webster, 2006; 1). Amplifying the trend toward 
patient-centred care, use of the Internet and digital technologies has flourished in the 
realm of healthcare. Summarising the potential import of connective media for health 
and illness, Sue Ziebland and Sally Wyke (2012) identified seven domains: finding 
information, feeling supported, maintaining relationships with others, affecting 
behaviour, experiencing health services, learning to tell the story and visualizing disease. 
Others have emphasized the potential for patient groups to use such media to direct 
research agendas, transform doctor-patient relations and ‘empower’ themselves through 
new modes of biosociality (Banner, 2014).  
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In the realm of chronic illness, studies have noted the therapeutic benefits of 
using social media platforms, in particular, to improve outcomes: ‘social ties forged in 
online spaces can perform self-management work that can improve an individual’s illness 
experience and can reach areas that are particularly difficult to navigate offline.’ (Allen et 
al, 2016; 61; Patel et al, 2015). In the case of epilepsy, regular contact with a healthcare 
professional has been demonstrated to improve self-management and reduce hospital 
admissions and recent studies seem to suggest that web-based interventions offer similar 
functionality, with Wicks et al. (2012) noting that online communication between PWEs 
appeared to improve outcomes (see also Walker et al., 2012).  
In my own interviews, participants expressed enthusiasm for the possibilities the 
Internet and social media afforded them. This included the ease with which they could 
find information on drugs and their side effects, but also the opportunity to connect and 
communicate with other PWE. For those unable to access support groups in the offline 
world – often reliant on evening public transport, many reported difficulty in attending 
such groups – online communities oriented around epilepsy, whether those run by 
epilepsy organizations or less formally arranged around Facebook groups, offered 
important social support. The more digitally literate interviewees I spoke to, the majority 
of whom had had the condition for a number of years, expressed their sense of the 
efficacy of sharing their experiences online and satisfaction in being able to offer advice 
to those newly-diagnosed with the condition.  
For other participants it was the assistive possibilities digitally-enabled devices 
offered that was most significant. When one interviewee stated that ‘My phone is my 
brain’, That is my brain it tells me what I’m doing, what has happened... My brain has no 
chance with the epilepsy’, she used the analogy between the memory capabilities of an 
internet-enabled telecommunications device and the brain to highlight the manner in 
which the phone had become a technological prosthesis in her life (Participant 4). For 
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others such technology is assistive in providing virtual contact with persons outside the 
house.  Networked videoconferencing technology offered one woman a way to ‘open up’ 
what had been a ‘very closed’ existence: ‘it’s like somebody has given a basket full of 
chocolates to a chocoholic.  It was fabulous.  I still can’t drive, but it’s opened up, I keep 
in touch, I Facetime with my sister. I just, I have more contact’ (Participant 6). For 
others such technology can be used as a means for relatives to visually ‘check in’ on 
them. 
Despite dominating treatment, such technologizing and black-boxing of the 
PWE is clearly not without its problems. Although, as Andrew Pickering (2010) points 
out, ‘[e]ven in its most asymmetric early moments, cybernetics never imagined that the 
classical model of control was in fact possible’, black-boxing can curtail the agency of the 
patient-subject in troublesome ways (p. 383). It privileges the expert-observer’s 
interpretation of inputs and outputs over the subject’s experiences. In the case of the 
PWE, this approach parallels stigmatizing features of the condition: the tonic-clonic 
seizure itself effectively black-boxes the subject who has no conscious access to the event 
that identifies them to the observer as possessing what Erving Goffman (1963) called a 
‘spoiled identity’. This has been exacerbated by what Webster describes as the 
‘reconfiguring of patient information and symptomatology as digital data’ (2006; 4). For 
PWE, increased self-tracking doesn’t necessarily equate to better management of their 
disease, nor increased agency or control over interpretation or the data itself. As 
Deborah Lupton has persuasively argued, we would do well to promote a ‘critical digital 
health studies’ (2014; 1347).  
 Over the last thirty years scholars such as Arthur Frank (2013), Arthur Kleinman 
(1988), Rita Charon (2006) and Kathryn Montgomery (1991) have developed the field of 
so-called ‘illness narratives’. Itself part of a response to the cybernetic, behaviourist 
understanding of the self so dominant in medicine at mid century, illness narratives 
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attend to the ways in which individuals experience, understand and claim agency over the 
representation of their illnesses. This scholarship has had a significant impact not only on 
scholars interested in thinking about relations between literature and medicine, but also 
with medicine itself and the generalized move towards patient-centred care. Attempting 
to respond to and resist the conceptualization of the subject as a series of symptoms or 
outputs, the behaviourist black box is (theoretically at least) repudiated in favour of 
narrative-sensitive medicine that is conscious of the individual experience (Vaccarella, 
2011; Vickers 2016).  
Yet in the increasingly technologized world of medicine, within the burgeoning 
field of e-health and even what Anna Munster (2011) has described as the ‘neurological 
turn’ in and against networked media, how precisely such illness narratives might operate 
in an online setting, and the existential issues this union might provoke, becomes a 
complex question. The prominent inclusion of patient stories (text-, audio- and video-
based) on websites such as NHS Choices, Patientstories.org.uk, Patientvoices.org.uk, 
Patientopinion.org.uk and Healthtalkonline.org indicates a certain perceived value or 
utility of such narratives in an online setting, and the relation of individual and ongoing 
stories of PWE on blogs and other social media platforms has exploded since the late 
1990s. While illness narratives themselves have become ‘of increasing importance 
precisely because they have provided a rich source of sociological data about the way in 
which people manage illness in practice’ (Webster 2007: 96), the value of sharing such 
narratives for those with stigmatized identities in an increasingly networked digital 
environment in which context collapse is commonplace, is somewhat uncertain.  
 
Digital Black Boxed Selves  
Dominant in conception of epilepsy representation and treatment, this ‘heuristic’ of the 
black box is ‘pervading the digital age’ (Berry, 2012) notes. Indeed, the black box is 
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‘widely taken as read both in terms of empirical descriptions of technology, the state, the 
market, everyday life today, and so forth, but also in terms of the possibility of a 
methodology to understand and explore it’ (n.pag). In one such example, media theorist 
Alexander Galloway argues that: 
  
It is thus today no longer a question simply of the enemy’s black box, but the 
black boxing of the self, of any node contained in a network of interaction. The 
enemy’s machine is not simply a device in a German airplane, it is ourselves: a 
call center employee, a card reader at a security checkpoint, a piece of software, a 
genetic sequence, a hospital patient. (2011: 243)  
 
Here, far from being restricted to programming, the black box is utilized as a concept 
and metaphor across a host of phenomena and processes, from the postfordian worker 
to political actions. In particular, the black box is utilized as an analogy for the human 
brain, bringing about as we have seen, what N. Katherine Hayles (1999) famously termed 
the ‘posthuman’, or cybernetics’ de-materialization of both information and the subject.  
The quotation above is taken from Galloway’s essay ‘Black Box, Black Bloc’ in 
which he characterizes contemporary society as dominated by the emergence of a 
‘specific kind of invisibility, a specific kind of blackness’ (2011: 239). In defining this 
invisibility, Galloway points to a shift in the way that the black box entity is conceived 
today: ‘It is no longer a question of illuminating the black box by decoding it, but rather 
that of functionalizing the black box by programming it.’ (2011: 244) The goal is no 
longer to open, reveal, render visible and transparent; instead, the focus is on operability 
and functionality. Like the PWE cajoled into self-monitoring when computational 
medicine’s visioning of the brain fails to relieve symptomatology, the limits of the black-
box-as-cipher approach are seemingly circumvented today by adopting the model of 
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black-box-as-function. In Galloway’s list mention of the hospital patients falls at the end, 
a seemingly casual example among many of the black-boxing of the self in contemporary 
society; however, in pursuing the conceptual affinities between epilepsy and new media, I 
want to pause on this example in order to consider not what the black box might tell us 
about the hospital patient, but rather what the hospital patient, or in fact the individual 
managing the chronic condition of epilepsy, might suggest about the more widespread 
‘black boxing of the self’ today.  
The representation of the PWE over the last half-century foreshadows in 
significant ways the representation of the citizen-subject in our digitally networked 
society. The seizing body highlights cultural anxieties around the programmability, 
control and functionality demanded of the subject today, with responsibility for 
monitoring that threshold placed firmly on the ‘patient’. The temporality that has often 
been associated with the experience of chronic illness, and the anticipatory nature of felt 
stigma, find a parallel in the so-called inferred ‘algorithmic identity’ that John Cheney-
Lippold (2011) identifies as characteristic of our digital world. Writing on the ‘feed-
forward’ operation of twenty-first century media, Mark Hansen notes that digital media 
have shifted from a ‘past-driven recording platform to a data-driven anticipation of the 
future’, whereby consciousness is bypassed (2015: 4). Similarly, Wendy Hui Kyong Chun 
describes a logic of ‘Habit + Crisis = Update’ as characterizing our digital environments 
and technologies (2016: 2). Networked time, for Chun, is structured by the twinning of 
habits – mechanical yet ‘creative anticipations based on past repetitions’ – and crisis, or 
punctuated time that demands real-time response (2016: 3). Although her example of the 
impact of networked time is that of slut-shaming, a more explicit analogy can be found in 
the chronically-ill person with uncontrolled epilepsy, who lives precariously between 
habit and crisis and for whom ‘update’ represents merely the prospect of yet more 
medication. Collectively, these scholars represent the digital user experience as mirroring 
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that which characterizes the experience of the chronically ill individual.  Representations 
of digital subjectivity and the technologising of the PWE have foreshadowed the 
experience of the digital subject today. 
It is in the arena of cognition that the PWE offers perhaps the most suggestive 
figure. The seizure, so problematic for a post-Englightenment conception of subjectivity 
that turn to higher-level consciousness to distinguish between human and machine, is 
also representative of a more complex understanding of cognition in our digital era as the 
interpenetration of different processes. This is a schema that has received a large amount 
of attention from recent critics of digital media; as they note, today’s millions of digitally-
networked devices and infrastructures exhibit what Hayles calls ‘cognitive nonconscious’ 
and operate at what Hansen describes as ‘precognitive’ levels (that is faster than human 
modes of awareness) (Hayles, 2017; Hansen, 2015). In this new environment of 
‘cognitive assemblages’ (Hayles, 2017), human higher-level consciousness has been 
decentred, and digital subjectivity necessarily conceived as more expansive. In this regard 
the historical non-normate PWE now models a new normate for the digital environ.  
However, lest we forget, this is also a potentially black-boxed self. I make the 
above parallels not to universalize the experience of disability or chronic illness in our 
contemporary digital society, nor minimize the challenges, representational and physical, 
faced by people living with epilepsy today. Rather, I do so to highlight the degree to 
which the digital subject, like the non-normate on which he or she is modelled, holds 
tenuous representational agency – even in a situation in which black-boxing might be 
conducted by the technological nonconscious and not by a human surveilling gaze. 
Expanding our definition of cognition does potentially posit a similarly expansive model 
of subjectivity; but it leaves agency, and particularly, agency over representation, 
ambiguously situated.  
 Galloway himself suggests that the black-boxing trend might mark the ‘death of 
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Freud and Marx and hermeneutics in general’ (2011: 239). He identifies a political 
equivalent of the black box, the black bloc, a ‘tactic of anonymization and massification’ 
wherein the strategy is not a demand for political representation, but disruption of power 
networks via nonparticipation, as dominating digital society (2011: 239). Yet for those 
struggling under the burden of excessive representation and a lack of interpretative 
agency, nonparticipation and even anonymization offer little comfort. Even if we posit a 
third strategy, neither black boxing or hermeneutics, what Best and Marcus (2009) and 
Love (2010) call ‘surface reading”, the subject’s interpretive agency remains elusive. 
Meanwhile, for the digital subject encouraged to ‘empower’ themselves by expressing 
their unique voice on social media, such requests now seem suspect. They mirror, in 
disquieting ways, the limits of the illness narrative movement for the PWE in the grip of 
Surveillance Medicine. Even as it offers an expanded conception of cognition, digital  
subjectivity mirrors the problematic control over representational agency that PWE’s 
evince. Far from an evocative technology of yesteryear, the space invaders track and 
target us today.  
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